Multiple studies have shown that cigarette taxes are more than fully passed through to cigarette prices and that access to a nearby state with a lower cigarette tax also reduces local cigarette prices. We provide new evidence on the price effects of two previously unstudied sources of tax competition: online sales and nearby Native American reservations. Using quarterly data on local cigarette prices from 1976-2003, we show that increases in state internet penetration and openings of nearby Native American casinos are associated with significantly lower local cigarette prices. Specifically, a 50 percentage point increase in internet penetration is associated with a 22-26 cent per-pack price reduction, while the opening of a Native American casino within 25 miles of a city center is associated with a 1.6-2.7 cent lower per-pack price. These effects are robust and are not observed for other local prices for which there is no potential tax savings. Our results further our understanding of how tax competition affects local cigarette prices and provide important context to multiple studies linking internet penetration and Native American reservations to cigarette smuggling behavior.
I. Introduction
A large literature in public finance has studied the price effects of various sales and excise taxes (e.g., Besley and Rosen 1999, Poterba 1996) . Cigarettes have received perhaps the most attention of any individual commodity, in part due to the very high excise tax burden on cigarettes that has grown even higher since the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement.
1 Multiple studies have documented the effects of excise taxes on cigarettes on cigarette prices (e.g., Keeler et al. 1996) , and several papers also relate the presence of a nearby lower tax border to cigarette prices as well (Hanson and Sullivan 2009, Harding et al. 2012 ). Sullivan and Dutkowsky (2012) , for example, show both that cigarette taxes are more than fully passed through to prices and that the presence of a nearby state border with a lower cigarette tax also puts downward pressure on local cigarette prices.
In this paper we provide the literature's first evidence on the local price effects of two other sources of competition from low-tax and tax-free cigarettes: online purchases (which enabled tax-free sales over our time period) and purchases on Native American reservations (where cigarettes can typically be purchased tax-free). 2 We use state internet penetration rates to proxy for online availability, and we use Native American casino openings to proxy for availability on reservations. Prior work has studied tax-free online 1 Numerous studies have linked cigarette excise taxes to youth and adult smoking and related outcomes. See, for example, Carpenter and Cook (2008) , Hansen et al. (2013) , and others. 2 Strictly speaking cigarettes are not completely tax-free on all Native American reservations, though in practice there are very large price differentials driven mainly by tax exemptions to tribes who are sovereign entities in the eyes of the government. For details, see Lovenheim (2008) and DeCicca et al. (2013b) . Over our time period cigarettes could be obtained tax-free from the internet, though this policy has recently changed. For simplicity we refer here to 'tax-exempt' or 'tax-free' cigarette sales in each of these contexts.
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p. 2 sales with respect to cigarette consumption and the elasticity of taxable sales (Goolsbee et al. 2010 ), but we are not aware of any research that has directly linked internet penetration to local cigarette prices. Similarly, prior work has studied cigarette purchasing behavior on Native American reservations (DeCicca et al. 2013a (DeCicca et al. , 2013b ), but we are not aware of any research directly linking Native American casino openings to local cigarette prices.
To preview, we use quarterly data on local cigarette prices for 723 cities from 1976-2003 and two-way fixed effects methods to replicate the main results of prior work that taxes are more than fully shifted to prices and that a nearby state with a lower cigarette tax also reduces cigarette prices. We then provide the literature's first evidence that internet penetration rates and Native American casinos also significantly reduce local cigarette prices. For online sales, we estimate that a fifty percentage point increase in the state internet penetration rate (roughly the increase observed over our sample period) is associated with a significantly lower per-pack cigarette price of about 22-26 cents. For Native American reservations, we estimate that the opening of a Native American casino within 25 miles of the city center (of which there were hundreds over our study period) is associated with a significantly lower per-pack cigarette price of 1.6-2.7 cents. We also demonstrate that the casino effect on prices is unique to Native American casinos: there is no price effect for openings of nearby non-Native American casinos (which may be expected to provide similar economic shocks but without the differential cigarette tax treatment), consistent with our preferred interpretation. Finally, we document that these price effects of cigarette tax competition are not observed for prices of other services (e.g., a haircut) for which there should be no differential tax competition. Overall, our findings provide the first evidence on the price effects of two previously unstudied sources of cigarette tax competition.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II briefly describes the previous literature.
Section III outlines the data and empirical approach. Section IV presents the results, and Section V concludes.
II. Previous Literature
Most empirical research on cigarette taxes and prices has estimated rates of tax passthrough; interested readers can find papers in the literature finding no effects of cigarette taxes on prices (Ashenfelter and Sullivan 1987), positive effects of cigarette taxes on prices that do not reflect full shifting (Harding et al. 2012 , Chiou and Muehlegger 2010 , DeCicca et al. 2013 , and positive effects of cigarette taxes on prices that reflect more than full shifting (Sullivan and Dutkowsky 2012 , Hanson and Sullivan 2009 , Keeler et al. 1996 . We restrict our brief review here to the handful of recent studies that are most relevant to our work.
Our study is most closely related to Sullivan and Dutkowsky (2012) , as we use the same local cigarette price data and two-way fixed effects empirical specifications.
They use ACCRA/C2ER and other data to demonstrate that state excise taxes are more than fully shifted to prices and that the presence of a nearby state border with a lower cigarette tax was negatively related to local cigarette prices. Specifically, they estimate that a $1 tax increases local cigarette prices by approximately $1.10. They also find that We are not aware of any prior studies that have studied the effects of availability of tax-free and low-cost cigarettes from online sales or Native American reservations on prices, but a handful of studies have examined the consumption and sales effects of such sources of tax competition. For example, Goolsbee et al. (2010) 
III. Data and Empirical Approach
Our primary source for local prices is ACCRA/C2ER. ACCRA data were originally designed to provide cost of living estimates for urban professionals and have been To estimate the price effects of tax competition from Native American casinos and online sales, we follow previous research and estimate two-way fixed effects models controlling for city and time fixed effects and linear city-specific trends. These models take the following form:
( 3 We note that the sampling of the ACCRA data results in some limitations: we do not observe prices in rural markets, nor do we observe prices of generic cigarettes over our sample period. 4 Individuals may purchase cigarettes tax-free on reservations prior to a casino opening. However, a casino opening provides a shock that drives economic activity to the reservation which may lead to an information transfer to store owners in nearby cities and consumers that cigarettes may be purchased tax-free. 5 We linearly interpolate an internet penetration rate for each state in the non-survey years. CITY and TIME are a full set of city and year-quarter dummies, respectively. CITY TREND is a vector of linear city-specific time trends constructed by taking each city fixed effect and interacting it with a variable TREND that equals 1 in the first quarter of our data, 2 in the second quarter of our data, and so forth. We report standard errors clustered at either the state or city level throughout (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004) .
IV. Results
6 These variables were chosen to most closely match the controls used in prior work and because they were consistently measured in the largest number of quarters of the ACCRA data.
p. 9 By the end of our sample period, this had increased to well over half of all households.
We present descriptive statistics of key variables in Table 1 . Table 1 shows that the mean price for a pack of Winston Kings in the ACCRA/C2ER data over our period was $2.54, adjusted for inflation. This average reflects considerable variation, as in some cities toward the early part of our sample period a pack of cigarettes cost less than 25 cents while in one city (New York City) toward the end of our sample a pack of cigarettes cost over $10. Average inflation adjusted excise taxes on a pack of cigarettes were 56 cents over the entire period but ranged from 2 cents (North Carolina) to $3.46 (Rhode Island). Internet penetration rates averaged 16 percent. Table 1 also shows sample means for the other prices used in our analyses: monthly apartment rent, gasoline,
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p. 10 and appliance repair costs (used for local cost shifters); a month subscription to a local newspaper, a movie ticket, dry cleaning for a 2 piece suit, and a man's haricut (used for placebo/falsification tests). Table 2 presents the key results on cigarette tax pass through and cigarette tax competition. Column 1 presents the results on the key variables from equation (1) for the full sample that uses any ACCRA/C2ER observation in the data, even if the city was only intermittently participating. In the subsequent columns, we present results from similarly specified models but where we impose increasingly stronger requirements about the number of year-quarter observations for which we require the city to have participated in the ACCRA/C2ER data collection (i.e., 25%, 50%, and 75% of year-quarter observations in Columns 2, 3, and 4, respectively). Doing so allows us to be more confident that the city fixed-effects and linear city trends are appropriately controlling for unobserved sources of city-specific bias in the relationship between our tax-free sources of competition and local cigarette prices. Additionally, it demonstrates the robustness of our results to different samples based on the percentage of data that are missing. For each sample we show the coefficient estimates on the cigarette tax, the presence of a lower tax border within 25 miles, the presence of a Native American casino within 25 miles, the presence of a non-Native American casino within 25 miles, and the state internet penetration rate.
The results in Table 2 replicate the well-documented finding that cigarette taxes are more than fully passed through to prices. Specifically, we estimate that a one dollar increase in cigarette taxes increases local cigarette prices by between one dollar and eight
p. 11 cents (columns 1 and 2) and one dollar and eleven cents (column 4), and this result is statistically significant at the one percent level in every sample. We also replicate the literature's previous finding that cities nearby states with lower cigarette taxes -whose variation is driven by cigarette tax changes in the fixed-effects models -have lower cigarette prices, consistent with greater cigarette tax competition reducing prices. These border state effects are statistically significant at the ten percent level or better in all models with clustering at the city level and in two of the four models when we cluster at the state level.
We next turn to the two sources of tax competition that have not been previously studied in the literature on local cigarette prices: Native American casinos and internet penetration rates. We find that the presence of a Native American casino within 25 miles of an ACCRA/C2ER city -whose variation in the fixed-effects models is generated by numerous casino openings over our sample period -is associated with lower local cigarette prices. These estimates are generally sizable and statistically significant at the ten percent level or better in models with state level clustering. Notably, the coefficients on the non-Native American casino indicator variable are smaller in magnitude and are statistically insignificant in all models, consistent with our interpretation that the increased tax competition due to the Native American casino is driving the downward pressure on local prices. Moreover, the point estimates on the Native American casino indicator are broadly similar to those for the variable indicating the presence of a nearby lower tax border. Turning to internet penetration rates, we find that higher internet penetration is associated with substantially lower local cigarette prices. We estimate that
p. 12 a fifty percentage point increase in state internet penetration is associated with a reduction in local cigarette prices by 22 to 25 cents, and these estimates are statistically significant. Taken together, the results in Table 2 provide new evidence on the importance of two previously unstudied sources of cigarette tax competition.
In Table 3 we present the robustness of the main findings in Table 2 to alternative choices about what constitute 'nearby' lower tax borders and Native American casinos.
For all models in Table 3 we restrict attention to cities observed in 75% of all yearquarter observations (i.e., the sample from column 4 of Table 2 ). Column 2 of Table 3 reprints the estimates using a radius of 25 miles, and we present results from other choices in Columns 1 (50 miles), 3 (10 miles), and 4 (5 miles). If our hypotheses about lower tax borders and Native American casinos reflecting cigarette tax competition are correct, we might expect a plausible monotonicity in the relationship between relatively closer tax-free sources compared to relatively farther tax-free sources. Of course, a challenge with this exercise is that the number of cities with nearby sources of tax-free competition gets smaller at smaller radii, so precision is an issue. Despite this challenge, the results in Table 3 are consistent with both lower tax borders and Native American casinos reflecting real effects of tax competition on local prices. At either 50 or 25 mile radii around the ACCRA/C2ER city center, we estimate significant effects of nearby lower tax borders and casinos on prices, and while the coefficients are not statistically significant at 10 or 5 miles, the point estimates are either similar in magnitude or plausibly larger than those from the model based on 50 and 25 mile rules. In all Finally, in Table 4 we demonstrate that the tax competition effects we identify are unique to cigarette prices. We present the coefficient estimates on the 'placebo'
outcomes from estimation of equation (1) for the full sample for each of other services whose prices were tracked over the same period as cigarettes: a month subscription to a local newspaper, a movie ticket, dry cleaning for a man's 2-piece suit, and a man's haircut. 8 For each of these items we find no consistently significant relationship between either the cigarette tax or any of the sources of lower-tax competition and the prices of the other goods. 9 These null findings lend further support to our evidence uniquely linking Native American casinos and internet penetration to local cigarette prices.
V. Conclusion
The results presented above provide new evidence on the local price effects of two previously unstudied sources of tax competition: online sales (as proxied by state internet penetration rates) and Native American reservations (as proxied by Native American casino openings). In each case, we find that greater tax competition puts significant downward pressure on local cigarette prices. Notably, we find no significant relationship 7 We also estimated models where we interacted the cigarette tax with the other variables reflecting tax competition to see if pass-through varies systematically with these lower-tax sources as suggested by prior work (Harding et al. 2012, Hanson and Sullivan 2009 ). The results from these models were uninformative due to insufficient precision. 8 The ACCRA data also tracks prices of a number of other commodities (e.g., tennis balls, man's shirt), but it is plausible that some of those goods could have had prices affected by ability to buy the items online so we focus on services which are not easily purchased online as our placebo outcomes. 9 The same was true when we restricted the sample to cities observed in 75% of year-quarter observations.
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p. 14 between non-Native American casinos and local cigarette prices, suggesting that the differential tax treatment at Native American casinos is driving the price effect. These results come from models that replicate the literature's basic findings on tax pass-through and access to lower tax borders, suggesting that our models are generally well specified.
Moreover, the effects we observe are not observed for local prices of other commodities that do not share similar tax competition dynamics as do cigarettes.
Our study has implications for interpreting series of studies that have looked at the effects of tax competition on local cigarette sales and consumption. Lovenheim (2008) find that distance to a lower tax border (measured by neighboring state or Native American reservation) significantly increases the home-tax-elasticity of sales, suggesting smuggling behavior. Stehr (2005) finds that cigarette sales respond both to own-tax as well as neighboring tax, consistent with widespread smuggling. Goolsbee et al. (2010) find that the tax elasticity of taxable sales is higher when there is more internet penetration, suggesting that people reduce purchases of home state cigarettes when taxes increase because tax-free sources such as online sales become increasingly attractive in the presence of tax hikes. Our new findings on local prices uncover important mechanisms underlying these effects on sales and consumption.
p. 15
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